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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether Russell Bucklew’s dilatory strategy of 
refusing to bring an as-applied challenge—which he 
was aware of for at least six years—until twelve days 
before his execution bars him from invoking equitable 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, especially considering 
the strong interest of his victims and their families in 
obtaining closure and an end to re-victimization 
through perpetual litigation. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE* 
Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (AVCV) 
is an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to 
promote and protect crime victims’ interests 
throughout the criminal justice process.  To achieve 
these goals, AVCV empowers victims of crime through 
legal advocacy and social services.  AVCV also 
provides continuing legal education to the judiciary, 
lawyers, and law enforcement. 
A key part of AVCV’s mission is giving the 
judiciary information and policy insights that may be 
helpful in the difficult task of balancing an accused’s 
constitutional rights with crime victims’ rights, while 
also protecting the wider community’s need for 
deterrence. 
Melissa Sanders is the sister of Michael 
Sanders, who was murdered by Russell Bucklew in 
1996.  After Michael’s murder, Melissa and her 
husband took care of Michael’s two young sons, John 
Michael and Zach, and she has served as the principal 
contact for the Sanders family regarding the 
prosecution of Russell Bucklew.  She has an interest 
in seeing justice carried out for her brother Michael 
and in attaining closure for his other family members. 
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represents that
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party
or counsel for any party.  No person or party other than
amici, its members, or its counsel made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
All parties have filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus
curiae briefs in accord with Supreme Court Rule 37.3.
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STATEMENT 
In 1996, Russell Bucklew brutally murdered 
Michael Sanders as his two young sons—only four and 
six years old—watched their father bleed to death in 
front of them.  Then, as the young daughters of 
Bucklew’s other victim, Stephanie Ray, cried and 
wailed for their mother, Bucklew handcuffed and 
dragged her away to endure hours of rape and torture.  
Bucklew’s reign of terror continued when he broke out 
of jail, forced victims to go into hiding, and ambushed 
one victim’s mother in her own home.  He was tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to death over 20 years ago.    
Bucklew’s violent crimes exacted an unspeakably 
cruel toll on his victims and their families.  But that 
was just the beginning of their suffering.  Bucklew has 
pursued a manipulative, dilatory litigation strategy 
that has robbed his surviving victims of even the 
smallest measure of closure and peace.    
1. Stephanie Ray first met Russell Bucklew in
mid-1995.  Scott Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 2, 
SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (March 21, 2011), available 
at https://tinyurl.com/y7ovn2wk; see also Bucklew v. 
Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006).  At 
twenty-one years old, she was looking for someone 
who could help her look after her two young girls, and 
at first, she thought she might have found that 
someone in Bucklew.  Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 
2; see also Scott Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 1, 
SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (March 20, 2011), available 
at https://tinyurl.com/yav2c22g (Ray was “all of 21” in 
March of 1996).  He helped her change the girls’ 
diapers, got them toys, and looked after them while 
she was working at her job at a pottery company.  
Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 2.   
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After a few months, he moved in with her and her 
daughters in a trailer in southeastern Missouri.  She 
had to provide for him—he used the benign tumors in 
his mouth as an excuse not to work—but their 
relationship nevertheless seemed to be making 
progress.  Ibid.  She was apparently unaware of his 
“extensive criminal history, including prior 
convictions for trespass, assault, burglary, stealing, 
driving while intoxicated, possession of marijuana, 
grand theft, [and] assaulting past girlfriends.”  436 
F.3d at 1014. 
But Bucklew could not maintain the façade 
forever, and by February 1996, Stephanie was ready 
to move on.  They often fought, his refusal to work was 
wearing on her, and, on top of it all, she was 
devastated by the loss of her baby early that year.  By 
Valentine’s Day, she told him they were done, and 
kicked him out of her trailer.  Moyers, Penalty of 
Death, Part 2; State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 86 
(Mo. 1998). 
2. Bucklew, however, was far from done.  A few 
weeks later, he walked into Stephanie’s trailer 
unannounced.  She was not there, but Michael 
Sanders, her co-worker and friend, was.  Bucklew 
grabbed a kitchen knife, put it to Michael’s throat, and 
said, “get the hell out of my house or I’m going to kill 
you.”  Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 2; 973 S.W.2d at 
86.  Bucklew let Michael leave when he explained he 
was just friends with Stephanie and there to pick up 
his guitar—he had been teaching her how to play. 
Bucklew returned to the trailer that evening and 
waited for Stephanie.  When she returned from work, 
he burst out from behind the door, pulled her to the 
ground, dragged her to the back bedroom, pinned her 
to the bed, and put a knife to her throat.  Ibid.  He cut 
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her jaw, punched her in the face—and then, 
miraculously, left.  436 F.3d at 1013. 
3. But Bucklew’s campaign of terror was just 
beginning.  The next day, he called Stephanie at work 
and vowed to kill her and her children:  “If I ever see 
you around that guy again, I will kill you and the kids.  
I will cut them up in front of you.”  Moyers, Penalty of 
Death, Part 2; 973 S.W.2d at 92-93.  Stephanie was 
terrified, but determined to protect her daughters.  
She called the police, and got an order of protection 
requiring Bucklew to stay away from them.  Moyers, 
Penalty of Death, Part 2; 973 S.W.2d at 86.  But she 
knew that was not enough—he was sure to come to 
their trailer, order or no.  That night, she took her 
children to her mother’s.  Moyers, Penalty of Death, 
Part 2.  The next day, Stephanie and her daughters 
moved in with Michael and his two young sons.  436 
F.3d at 1013. 
4. But there would be no peace for Stephanie, 
Michael, or their children.  On the night of March 20, 
1996, “Bucklew stole his nephew’s car and left with 
two pistols, two sets of handcuffs, and a roll of duct 
tape.”  Ibid.  He stalked Stephanie throughout the 
day—watching her as she left work, ran errands, and 
eventually returned to Michael’s trailer.  Ibid.  Inside 
the trailer were Stephanie’s daughters and Michael’s 
sons:  John Michael Sanders (age six) and his brother 
Zach (age four).  The two boys played in the living 
room as their father and Stephanie spoke in the 
bedroom.  Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 1.   
After briefly waiting outside, Bucklew approached 
Michael’s trailer and knocked on the front door.  
Hearing the knock, six-year-old John Michael 
unlocked the door.  Ibid.  Bucklew burst into the house 
“with a pistol in each hand” but before he could hurt 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237782 
 
5 
 
the children, Michael appeared and shoved them 
down the hall.  973 S.W.2d at 86; Moyers, Penalty of 
Death, Part 1.  But that was all he could do.  Bucklew 
“yelled ‘get down’ and without further warning began 
shooting at [Michael].”  973 S.W.2d at 86.   
Slumped against the wall, his lung shredded by a 
bullet, Michael tried to pacify his killer, pleading, “I’m 
cool, man.  I’m down.”  Ibid.; Moyers, Penalty of Death, 
Part 1.  Unsatisfied, Bucklew “aimed the gun at 
[Michael’s] head”—but was distracted by another 
target.  973 S.W.2d at 86.  “[W]hen he saw [Michael’s] 
six-year-old son,” Bucklew “fired at the boy instead.”  
Ibid.  Bucklew later bragged that he thought he’d 
killed the first-grader, Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 
2—but fortunately, the shot missed.  973 S.W.2d at 
86. 
As Michael lay dying, Stephanie stepped forward 
to protect him, standing between him and his killer.  
Ibid.  Bucklew demanded that she drop to her knees—
and when she refused, he “pistol-whipped [Stephanie], 
breaking her jaw, and knocking her to the kitchen 
floor in a semi-coherent condition.”  Id. at 91.  He 
handcuffed Stephanie, dragged her into the stolen car, 
and kidnapped her “from [Michael’s] trailer as her 
children cried.”  Ibid. 
Over the next five hours, Bucklew brutally raped 
Stephanie multiple times.  Later, “when she did not 
perform every act [Bucklew] demanded,” Bucklew v. 
State, 38 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Mo. banc 2001), he “took 
her to a secluded spot and put a gun to her head and 
raped her while her hands were taped in front of her 
body,” 973 S.W.2d at 91.  After subjecting Stephanie 
to hours of torture, Bucklew was finally apprehended 
when the highway patrol cornered him—but even 
then they first had to defeat him in a gun battle.  38 
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S.W.3d at 397.  Bucklew told Stephanie that he “would 
take as many police officers with him as he could in a 
shootout,” 973 S.W.2d at 93—and although no officers 
were killed, one was wounded—and before Bucklew 
was arrested, he fired a round into Stephanie’s leg.  
Scott Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3, SOUTHEAST 
MISSOURIAN (March 22, 2011), available at 
https://tinyurl.com/ybsz7t3b. 
By the time Bucklew was apprehended, Michael 
had bled to death.  973 S.W.2d at 87; 436 F.3d at 1014. 
5. Even after all this, Bucklew was not done 
tormenting his victims.  While awaiting trial for 
murder, Bucklew claimed his condition interfered 
with his eating, allowing him to excuse his otherwise-
alarming 15-pound weight loss—which helped him fit 
into a trash bag that an accomplice tossed into an 
outgoing bin.  Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3.  As 
soon as Bucklew’s escape was discovered, Stephanie 
and her daughters were placed in protective custody, 
and her mother, Barbara, stayed at a hotel with her 
boyfriend Ed Frenzel.  Ibid.   
After two days at the hotel, Barbara and Ed 
returned home—with a police escort—to collect a few 
belongings.  Ibid.  After their escort swept the home 
and gave the all clear, they spent an hour or so tidying 
up, until Barbara went to check the lock on the back 
door.  As she turned to walk back to the living room, 
Bucklew burst out of a closet and ambushed her.  436 
F.3d at 1014; Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3.  
Screaming “[y]ou’re going to die,” Bucklew attacked 
the couple with a knife and hammer, but they 
managed to escape their home with their lives.  
Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3. 
6. Bucklew was eventually recaptured and 
convicted in state court of murder, kidnapping, and 
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rape.  He was sentenced to death, and the Missouri 
Supreme Court affirmed his sentence on direct 
appeal.  973 S.W.2d 83.  Bucklew’s state and federal 
habeas petitions were denied as well.  See 38 S.W.3d 
395; 436 F.3d 1010.   
7. With normal avenues of review exhausted, 
Bucklew adopted a new strategy to avoid the 
execution of his sentence—bring a facial challenge to 
Missouri’s lethal injection protocol under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, but keep an as-applied challenge (based on his 
benign oral tumors) in reserve, ready to use when 
most strategically advantageous.   
Having exploited his condition to escape from jail 
over a decade before, Bucklew was well aware of his 
symptoms—and that they might provide some basis 
for an as-applied challenge.  In June 2008, Bucklew 
filed a pleading asking for $7,200 to hire a medical 
expert to support a clemency application—and 
supported his request by claiming that, because of his 
condition, “execution by lethal injection may pose a 
substantial and intolerable risk of inflicting serious 
harm and excruciating pain.”  Resp. App. at 798a.  His 
2008 filing included extensive argument that 
“Bucklew will suffer the risk of serious harm 
amounting to cruel and unusual punishment during 
the administration of Missouri’s lethal injection 
protocol in light of his affliction with cavernous 
hemangioma.”  Id. at 796a.  It even stated that 
Bucklew sought to demonstrate that Missouri’s 
procedure was unconstitutional “as applied uniquely 
to Mr. Bucklew.”  Id. at 797a (emphasis in original).   
Yet despite his obvious awareness of a possible as-
applied challenge based on his condition, Bucklew 
refused for years to bring such a challenge.  Instead, 
he brought or joined a series of facial challenges—
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always ensuring that his as-applied challenge was at 
the ready for later use.   
Bucklew first attempted to intervene in a pending 
facial challenge to Missouri’s injection procedure in 
July 2008, when he moved to intervene in Clemons v. 
Crawford, 2:07-CV-04129 (W.D. Mo.).  Just two weeks 
earlier, the Missouri Supreme Court denied his 
motion to reconsider its previous order granting the 
State’s motion to set execution dates “in due course.”  
Dkt. 78 at 3, Clemons v. Crawford, 2:07-CV-04129 
(W.D. Mo.).  To postpone execution, Bucklew moved to 
intervene in the federal case—arguing, repeatedly, 
that he was identically situated to the other plaintiffs 
(none of whom had his condition).  See id. at 8,  
(“Timeliness is no objection to the intervention of a 
person who fits the model of the other plaintiffs to the 
extent that [Bucklew] does”); ibid. (“the risks of severe 
pain that [Bucklew] faces are the same as those that 
plaintiffs face”); id. at 9 (“By virtue of their common 
stake in a positive outcome, Mr. Bucklew’s interests 
are bound up with those of the four [plaintiffs]”); ibid. 
(claiming Bucklew would “adopt by reference” any 
pleadings filed by the other plaintiffs). 
After Bucklew’s attempt at intervention was 
denied, Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1129 
(8th Cir. 2009), he joined a different challenge 
claiming Missouri’s protocol was preempted by the 
Federal Controlled Substances Act and the Federal 
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Dkt. 6, Ringo v. 
Lombardi, 2:09-CV-04095 (W.D. Mo.).  That action 
was dismissed as moot when Missouri was no longer 
able to procure the drugs necessary to implement its 
protocol—and, up through the end of the case, 
Bucklew gave no indication that his position varied 
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from any other plaintiff on death row.  See Ringo v. 
Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2012).   
A few months after that action was dismissed, 
Bucklew joined another group of death-row plaintiffs 
in a facial Eighth Amendment challenge to the new 
drug protocol—arguing that Missouri’s 2012 protocol 
posed “an objectively intolerable risk of severe pain” 
for any capital defendant.  Dkt. 1-2 at 13, In re 
Lombardi, 2:12-cv-04209 (W.D. Mo.).  After Missouri 
implemented the current pentobarbital protocol in 
October 2013, Bucklew joined an amended complaint 
challenging that protocol—again on facial grounds, 
and without any suggestion that it might be uniquely 
unconstitutional as applied to him.  Dkt. 183, In re 
Lombardi, 2:12-cv-04209 (W.D. Mo.).  
The district court in that case issued a discovery 
order requiring that the identities of the physician, 
pharmacist, and laboratory involved in prescribing 
and procuring the pentobarbital be disclosed—and the 
Eighth Circuit vacated the order, effectively holding 
that the facial challenge was meritless given the 
failure to identify an alternative means of execution.  
In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2014).  On 
remand, Bucklew—along with the other plaintiffs—
refused to plead a feasible alternative, and their 
Eighth Amendment claims were dismissed.  Dkt.  443, 
In re Lombardi, 2:12-cv-04209 (W.D. Mo.). 
8. On May 9, 2014, less than two weeks before his 
scheduled execution, Bucklew finally brought his as-
applied challenge.  App. at 1; Bucklew v. Lombardi, 
783 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2015).  Having held that 
challenge in reserve for years, Bucklew was able to 
secure a stay of execution from this Court while 
Missouri’s other capital defendants could not, see 783 
F.3d at 1123–24, and he staved off dismissal of his 
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new as-applied claims despite the dismissal of the 
other defendants’ facial challenges.  Id. at 1129.   
Even while litigating this “new” claim, Bucklew 
was careful to preserve as many opportunities for 
future litigation as possible.  Required to plead an 
“alternative” execution method, Bucklew vaguely 
argued that “lethal gas” could be a comparatively less 
painful option.  Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087, 
1094 (8th Cir. 2018).  But Bucklew was also careful to 
preserve his ability to argue against the use of gas, 
should it ever somehow become available.1  On one 
hand, Bucklew argued that the State could not 
affirmatively disprove the viability of lethal gas at 
summary judgment—while on the other hand, he 
ensured that his own expert did not actually endorse 
lethal gas as an alternative method.  Id. at 1094–95.  
If lethal gas ever does become available, Bucklew will 
assuredly point to his own expert’s testimony to argue 
that lethal gas is unconstitutional as applied to him. 
9. The district court and the court of appeals saw 
through Bucklew’s strategy and held that, even after 
“extensive discovery,” he had not made any real effort 
to discern what procedures would actually be used at 
his execution—and thus could not show that any such 
procedures would be more painful than his “lethal 
gas” alternative.  883 F.3d at 1096 (“Bucklew simply 
asserts that, in comparing execution by lethal 
injection and by lethal gas, we must accept his 
speculation that defendants will employ these risk-
increasing procedures.”).  As the Eighth Circuit noted, 
                                         
 1 Of course, even if Bucklew had conceded the constitutionality 
of lethal gas, it is unlikely that such a concession would ever 
have any practical effect on him given that Missouri has not 
used gas for executions since 1965, and its only gas chamber 
sits in a museum.  Ibid; App. at 487. 
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Bucklew successfully prolonged his as-applied 
challenge in 2015 by arguing for the necessity of 
further fact-finding—and then showed no interest in 
that fact-finding once his challenge was revived.  Id. 
at 1095.   
Specifically, three years before, Bucklew argued 
that the Eighth Circuit should reverse the dismissal 
of his complaint to allow him to take further discovery 
regarding what changes the State could make to its 
protocol to accommodate his condition—because 
without knowing the exact parameters of the protocol, 
Bucklew could not effectively argue against them.  Id. 
at 1095.  But once Bucklew secured reversal and 
remand, he stopped caring about what changes 
Missouri would make to its procedures, and did 
nothing to determine what, exactly, the effects of 
those procedures would be with respect to his 
condition.  Id. at 1096.  The district court ruled for the 
State and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 1097. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Decades-Long Delays In Obtaining 
Justice Inflict Immeasurable Harm On 
Victims’ Families. 
 
For more than two decades, the pain and grief 
suffered by Michael Sanders’ family—including his 
two boys who watched their father die at Bucklew’s 
hands—has been compounded by the interminable 
delays in executing Bucklew’s sentence.  Although 
there is no doubt that Bucklew murdered Michael 
Sanders—and assaulted, kidnapped, and raped 
Stephanie Ray—their families continue to await 
justice and closure.  And they are not alone.  Across 
the Nation, victims suffer immeasurable harm from 
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decades-long delays in executing sentences—delays 
that rob victims’ families of even a modicum of peace 
and closure.   
A. The Family Members Of Bucklew’s 
Victims Continue To Be Victimized 
By His Dilatory And Manipulative 
Litigation Tactics. 
 
The suffering of Michael Sanders’ family has been 
relentlessly exacerbated by decades of undue delays 
and manipulative litigation tactics. 
John Michael Sanders still remembers rushing to 
his father’s motionless body after Bucklew shot him 
and abducted Stephanie.  Moyers, Penalty of Death, 
Part 1, supra.  He remembers his father struggling to 
speak to him before dying of his wounds.  And he often 
replays that day in his head, blaming himself—then 
all of six years old—for unlocking the door when 
Bucklew knocked.  “I thought if I hadn’t unlocked the 
door, he wouldn’t have been able to kick it open,” he 
remarked in a 2011 news article.  Ibid.  “There could 
have been a different ending,” he mused—one where 
his father’s murder, Stephanie’s abduction, and 
Bucklew’s escape never happened.  Sometimes, John 
Michael dreams that his father gets to watch him and 
his brother grow up, graduate high school, and begin 
happy lives for themselves.  Ibid.  “I dream that 
because I guess there’s a part of me that still wants to 
believe that,” he says.  John Michael believes that 
Bucklew deserves the death penalty and that 
Bucklew’s execution will grant him closure.  Until 
then, he finds it difficult to fully move on.  Ibid.   
Zach, John Michael’s younger brother, has had 
similar difficulties dealing with his father’s brutal 
murder while Bucklew indefinitely prolongs this 
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litigation and delays the execution of his sentence.  
Zach—whose first memory is his father’s murder—
“has suffered through nights of fitful sleep, bad 
dreams and occasionally has awakened, crying.”  Ibid.  
Like John Michael, Zach believes that Bucklew’s 
execution will help him fully come to terms with what 
has happened.  Both brothers have expressed their 
willingness to attend the execution, and finally 
experience some closure and finality.  Ibid.  
Michael Sanders’ father, Jerry, his mother 
Dorothy, and his sister, amicus Melissa Sanders—
who helped raise John Michael and Zach—have also 
borne the pain of undue delays which have taken a 
great toll on their lives and denied them peace.  “I’m 
angry about it.  Yeah, you bet,” Jerry Sanders told a 
reporter.  “It’s gotten to where I deal with it easier, 
but to see [Bucklew] go would give me peace of mind.  
It would put me to rest.  I really think it would.”  Scott 
Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 4, Southeast 
Missourian (March 23, 2011), available at 
https://tinyurl.com/y7asb8bw.  Michael’s sister 
Melissa agrees that Bucklew’s sentence should have 
been carried out years ago.  Ibid.  But over 20 years 
after Bucklew was sentenced to death, they are still 
waiting for justice and closure. 
B. Research Confirms What The 
Experience of Victims Makes 
Plain—Undue Delays in the 
Administration of Justice Harm 
Victims of Violent Crimes. 
 
Not surprisingly, the academic literature confirms 
what the experiences of families like the Sanders 
makes painfully clear—long after the immediate loss 
and physical trauma are over, crime victims and their 
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loved ones continue to suffer from psychological 
wounds that refuse to heal.  Courts frequently 
overlook the ways in which delayed proceedings 
compound that harm and exacerbate the initial 
injuries victims suffer. 
It is well known, of course, that violent crime 
inflicts various immediate psychological traumas on 
victims and those close to them.  Most obviously, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is commonly 
documented among the victims of violent crime.  See 
Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of 
Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental 
Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress 182, 182 (2010); Dean G. 
Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of 
Crime Victims: Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. 
Traum. Stress 119, 119 (2003).  PTSD can afflict not 
only the direct victims of violent crime, but also those 
who experience its profound repercussions more 
indirectly, such as family members and friends.  
Kilpatrick & Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime 
Victims: Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. Traum. 
Stress at 125–27 (2003).   
PTSD is far from the only wound that violent 
crime can inflict on victims.  Depression, substance 
abuse, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and suicide also 
number among them.  Parsons & Bergin, The Impact 
of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental 
Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress at 182.  All of these 
injuries are compounded when the adjudicative 
process is subject to dilatory maneuvering and 
gamesmanship.   
Of course, from the victim’s perspective, 
proceedings rarely move quickly enough—“trial is 
typically delayed through scheduling conflicts, 
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continuances, and other unexpected delays 
throughout the course of the trial.”  Mary Beth Ricke, 
Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, 
Improvements, and Alternatives to Legislative 
Protection, 41 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 181, 183 (2013).  
“Victims of the crimes are already heightened 
emotionally with anxiety and anticipation of the 
impending trial, and these delays lead to further and 
unnecessary trauma.”  Ibid.  It thus is not surprising 
that “multiple studies” demonstrate “the negative 
effect on a victim’s healing process when there is a 
prolonged trial of the alleged attacker because the 
actual judicial process is a burden on the victim.”  Id. 
at 193; Ulrich Orth & Andreas Maercker, Do Trials of 
Perpetrators Retraumatize Victims?, 19 J. 
Interpersonal Violence 212, 215 (2004).  “The years of 
delay exact an enormous physical, emotional, and 
financial toll” on victims.  Dan S. Levey, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice, 89 Judicature 289, 291 (2006); see 
also Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What 
They Say at the End: Capital Victims' Families and 
the Press, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 492 (2003) (“Ending 
this painful process can become a major goal for the 
victim’s family-- sometimes the only realizable goal of 
the execution.”). 
Abundant academic literature thus confirms what 
common sense and experience make plain.  A victim’s 
experience with the criminal justice system—
particularly when the process is long-delayed, 
convoluted, and seemingly never-ending—compounds 
the initial effects of violent crime.  See Ricke, Victims’ 
Right, 41 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y at 182-183; see also 
Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime 
Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. Traum. 
Stress 159, 159 (2003).  A victim’s experience with the 
criminal justice system often “means the difference 
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between a healing experience and one that 
exacerbates the initial trauma.”  Parsons & Bergin, 
The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on 
Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress at 182.   
The harm caused by drawn-out criminal justice 
proceedings is especially acute in cases involving 
capital punishment, such as this one, which often 
involve decades of delay and false stops and starts 
before the case is finally over.  Delay in death penalty 
cases means that “[c]hildren who were infants when 
their loved ones were murdered are now, as adults, 
still dealing with the complexities of the criminal 
justice system.”  Levey, Balancing the Scales of 
Justice, 89 Judicature at 290.   
“The automatic appeals, and often repeated 
appeals,” in death penalty cases “are continually 
brutal on victim family members.”  Ibid.  “Year after 
year, survivors summon the strength to go to court, 
schedule time off work, and relive the murder of their 
loved ones over and over again . . . . The years of delay 
exact an enormous physical, emotional, and financial 
toll.”  Id. at 290–91.  The delays also keep family 
members from experiencing a sense of “closure”—the 
“hope that they will be able to put the murder behind 
them.”  Gross & Matheson, What They Say at the End, 
88 Cornell L. Rev. at 489, 490-94. 
II. Bucklew’s Manipulative And Dilatory 
Suit—Based On A Claim He Refused To 
Bring For Years—Exemplifies The Toll 
Exacted On Victims Of Violent Crime As 
They Wait For Justice And Closure. 
 
The Eighth Circuit properly put an end to 
Bucklew’s decades-long abusive litigation, strategic 
posturing, and dilatory tactics—and its judgment 
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should be affirmed.  For as long as this Court has 
recognized § 1983 method-of-execution claims, it has 
also recognized the potential for their abuse.  See, e.g., 
Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of California, 
503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (rejecting 
method-of-execution challenge and explaining that 
“[e]quity must take into consideration the State’s 
strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and 
Harris’ obvious attempt at manipulation.”).  And this 
Court has held that “[b]oth the State and the victims 
of crime have an important interest in the timely 
enforcement of a sentence” that should be protected 
by dismissing abusive § 1983 suits.  Hill v. 
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (citing Gomez).   
In Hill, this Court held that capital defendants 
could sometimes step outside the habeas framework 
and use § 1983 to challenge the method of their 
planned execution.  Id. at 583.  At the same time, the 
Court recognized the obvious potential for abuse in 
using § 1983 as a procedural vehicle given that, among 
other things, such suits are not subject to the bar on 
successive habeas petitions—and warned that 
repetitive, dilatory, and strategic § 1983 suits should 
not be allowed to trump the interest of victims.  Id. at 
584.  The Court explained that its decisions upholding 
§ 1983 method-of-execution suits “do not diminish 
that interest, nor do they deprive federal courts of the 
means to protect it.”  Ibid.  This is so, in part, because 
“the ‘last-minute nature of an application’ or an 
applicant's ‘attempt at manipulation’ of the judicial 
process may be grounds for denial of a stay” or other 
relief.  Ibid. (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654).   
Although Hill was most directly concerned with 
stay applications, it approvingly cited cases that 
applied the same reasoning to dismiss outright 
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“[r]epetitive or piecemeal” § 1983 claims.  Id. at 584–
85 (noting courts’ use of their equitable authority “to 
dismiss suits they saw as speculative or filed too late 
in the day” as an example of how “dilatory or 
speculative suits” could be addressed); id. at 584 
(citing White v. Johnson, 429 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 
2005), which dismissed a § 1983 action because the 
claimant “has been on death row for more than six 
years, and only now, with his execution imminent, has 
decided to challenge a procedure for lethal injection 
that the State has been using for his entire stay on 
death row”). 
It is difficult to imagine a more appropriate case 
for exercising equitable authority to protect crime 
victims against repeated manipulation of the judicial 
process than this one.  Bucklew refused to make his 
as-applied challenge until the last moment—a mere 
12 days before his execution—despite his awareness 
of the availability of such a challenge at least 6 years 
earlier.  See White, 429 F.3d at 574 (dismissing § 1983 
method-of-execution challenge where the claimant 
was aware of its availability “for more than six years” 
and only brought it “with his execution imminent”).  
Despite virtually unlimited opportunities to bring 
(and have resolved) any as-applied claims during that 
six-year period, Bucklew chose not to do so.  Even 
after he was finally forced to bring his claim, he has 
been careful to avoid any real merits determination—
arguing that a lethal gas procedure Missouri has not 
used for 50 years could possibly be constitutional, 
while offering the testimony of an expert who claims 
that no procedure whatsoever, gas or otherwise, could 
be satisfactory.   
Unless the judgment below is affirmed, Bucklew 
will continue to bring suit after suit for no purpose 
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other than drawing out these proceedings and 
dragging his victims through as many years of 
litigation as he possibly can.  The “important interest” 
of crime victims that this Court recognized in Hill 
should be vindicated here by holding that the equities 
lie with the victims who have been denied peace and 
closure for over two decades—and affirming the 
judgment below on that ground.     
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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